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I . INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues∗
Prosecuting business enterprises for violations of war crimes is an issue that has come
up repeatedly as human rights become more respected, and more enforced, around the
world. The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is another recent step the
international community has taken in order to punish those who violate human rights.
Approximately 60,000 multinational firms exist, with great economic power, and few
legal controls.1 Corporations are large, powerful organizations that, in the interest of
returning shareholder profits, may commit human rights abuses. Can the International
Court prosecute these abuses? If not, how can our globalized society address these
violations?
B. Summary of Conclusions
Corporations, and other business enterprises, are recognized as persons under
domestic laws, and as organs of society, with many of the attending rights and
responsibilities of people. This paper will show, however, that the ICC does not have the
power to prosecute such corporations under the ICC statute. This analysis is based
∗

Can international law be applied to business enterprises as non-state actors?
In your memorandum please analyze: The relevant parts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which applies not only to states but also to such “organs of society” as businesses; The responsibilities
under humanitarian law imposed on armed opposition groups as nonstate actors; The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; Individual criminal responsibility (including that of
corporate officers) establish Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948),ed by the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court; Increasing
responsibilities voluntarily assumed by businesses under the OECD, the ILO, and the Global Compact.

1

Eric W. Orts, War and the Business Corporation, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 549 (2002). (Corporations
make up 51 of the 100 largest integrated economic entities.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 50]

1

primarily on the Rome Statute which provides the authority for the ICC. Nonetheless,
there is an emerging norm of prosecuting corporations, and a rising sentiment that
corporations should be brought to justice for human rights violations. Customary
International Law (CIL), is analyzed, although CIL does not permit prosecution of
corporations for violating human rights laws. Lastly, this paper discusses other possible
solutions the prosecutor of the ICC can take. While corporations may not be
prosecutable, for example, those who run them are still subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Rome Statute
1. Article 25
The Rome Statute is the treaty by which provides the ICC its authority. The court
only has the authority and jurisdiction granted to it by Article 1 of the Rome Statute, “An
International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be a permanent
institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the
Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.”2
According to the Rome Statute, the Court only has jurisdiction over natural
persons. Article 25 reads “The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons
pursuant to this Statute.”3 The language of this statute defines the jurisdiction of the

2

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, Art. 1
[hereinafter “Rome Statute”]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
3

Id., Art. 25. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

2

court, the question presented is whether or not this language is sufficiently ambiguous to
give the ICC jurisdiction over corporations.
Black’s Law dictionary defines a legal person as an artificial person. An entity such as a corporation - that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties of a
human being, is a legal person, whereas a natural person is a human being.4 While
corporations are considered persons, or entities, under various local laws, they are not
natural persons. Corporations may be subject to the law when the law reads “persons” or
“legal persons”. For example, the United States judicial system has interpreted the due
process clause of its Constitution to extend those protections to corporations,5 even
though the plain language of the amendment refers only to persons,6 but has ruled that
corporations are not “citizens” of the United States.7 While, for moral issues, some might
argue that corporations are persons, the language used in Article 25 makes clear that
corporations are not to be under the jurisdiction of the ICC.8

4

Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), person. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 62].

5

Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). (“The defendant
Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
6

U.S. Const Amend. XIV (“Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 76].
7

Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27].

8

See: Richard S. Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing, pp 77 – 80, 84 – 96 (1994). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab36].

3

2. Legislative History
In 1992, The United Nations requested that the International Law Commission draft a
statute for the yet to be formed ICC.9 In 1994, the UN established an ad-hoc committee
to review that draft. The first Preparatory Commission session was in 1995, and the work
continued through 1998, when the Rome Statute was adopted the U.N. on July 17 of that
year.10
Early documents regarding the establishment of the ICC discuss only crimes
committed by individuals. For example, in 1992, one of the men instrumental in
establishing the ICC wrote about extraditing individuals to the ICC11 and prosecuting
individual political leaders.12
The 1994 draft Statute included a proposal from France to expand jurisdiction to
include legal persons, although this proposal was withdrawn. 13 The draft statute
specifically considered jurisdiction over legal persons, except for States: “The Court shall

9

G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/53 (1994). (“Recalling its resolution 47/33 of
25 November 1992, in which it requested the International Law Commission to undertake the elaboration
of a draft statute for an international criminal court.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
20].

10

Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10, 17 Jul 1998 [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 5].

11

M. Cherif Bassiouni and Christoper L. Blakesley, The Need for An International Criminal Court in the
New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 151 (1992). (“Surrender of the individual to
the international criminal court would have avoided the potential conflict between the two countries. Also,
a number of cases involving surrender of individuals in international terror- violence, as well as
international drug trafficking, would be resolved by such a mechanism.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
12

Id. at 173. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

13

Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court and
Draft Final Act UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

4

also have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States, when the crimes
were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or representatives.”14
The problem of private security forces was of special concern, as those employees
could escape local prosecution if they were not citizens or residing in the State wherein
the abuses occurred. To address this, Madagascar and Comoros proposed including “a
new crime of mercenarism to impute criminal liability onto such private security
corporations.”15
None of this language was included in the final Statute. One source reports that the
French proposal was withdrawn when the State parties could not agree on the specific
contours of corporate liability within the necessary time frame.16 Another source reports
that some countries “could not accept the concept that corporations could be held
criminally liable.”17 Nonetheless, The Chair of the Preparatory Commission’s Working
Group on Penalties stated that “as a consequence of the non-inclusion of individual

14

Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held 11 to 21 February 1997, Article 25,
in M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, An Article-by-Article
Evolution of the Statute from 1994 – 1998, 194, Vol. 2 (2005). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 4].

15

Stephen Kabel, Our Business is People (Even if it Kills Them): The Contribution of Multinational
Enterprises to the Conflict in the Republic of Congo, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461 (2004). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
16

Rebecca M. Bratspies, “Organs of Society”: A Plea for Human rights Accountability for Transnational
Enterprises and Other Business Enterprises, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L 9, 27 (2005). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
17

Stephen Kabel, Our Business is People (Even if it Kills Them): The Contribution of Multinational
Enterprises to the Conflict in the Republic of Congo, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461 (2004). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].

5

criminal responsibility for legal persons in article 25, a provision on penalties for legal
persons was ultimately not included.”18
While an argument can be made that if the withdrawal was not due to substantive
opposition, it should therefore not be binding, the argument is not persuasive.19
Regardless of the reasoning for this withdrawal, it is clear that the drafters recognized the
difference between natural and legal persons; further, it is clear that the drafters did not
include jurisdiction over legal persons.
Indeed, The Chair of the Preparatory Commission’s Working Group on Penalties
stated that the ICC did not have jurisdiction over legal persons, saying that “[The ICC's
jurisdiction] does not cover legal persons.”20 He continued, pointing out that prior
tribunals only punished natural persons. 21

18

Steven Glickman, Victims’ Justice: Legitimizing the Sentencing Regime of the International Criminal
Court, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 229, 267 (2004). (citing Rolf Einar Fife, Article 77: Applicable
Penalties, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 991. (Otto Triffterer ed.,
1999 at 993-94) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
19

Rebecca M. Bratspies, “Organs of Society”: A Plea for Human Rights Accountability for Transnational
Enterprises and Other Business Enterprises, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 9 (2005). (“When, despite intense
negotiations, it became clear that consensus could not be reached in the time remaining at the drafting
convention, France, the language’s primary sponsor, withdrew the proposal. As a result, the final version of
the Rome Statute granted the ICC jurisdiction over only natural persons. According to Clapham, this
rejection was not due to any fundamental opposition to the principle of legal person liability, but was
instead attributable to a lack of time to resolve differing traditions of corporate liability. The fact that ICC
jurisdiction does not extend to legal persons should not blind us to existing and emerging possibilities to
assert international criminal jurisdiction under international law.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 41].
20

Steven Glickman, Victims’ Justice: Legitimizing the Sentencing Regime of the International Criminal
Court, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 229, 267 (2004). (citing Rolf Einar Fife, Article 77: Applicable
Penalties, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 991. (Otto Triffterer ed.,
1999 at 993-94) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
21

Id. (“While the Nuremberg Statute did contain provisions on criminal organizations, it did not actually
provide for penalties against such organizations. The Yugoslavia and Rwanda Statutes only provide for
criminal responsibility for natural persons.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44].

6

Generally, when the literal meaning of a statute is the only possible interpretation
of a statute, it should be “unswervingly followed.”22 Being that the drafters fully
understood the distinction between natural and legal persons, and intended to include
only natural persons under the jurisdiction of the ICC, the argument that legal persons
may be included in the ICC’s jurisdiction fails.
B. Emerging Norms of Prosecuting Corporations
Many courts have already addressed the issue of prosecution corporations. These
courts, both domestic and international tribunals, have started extending jurisdiction from
individual actors to corporations. Additionally, corporations and States have signed
numerous treaties addressing the responsibility of corporations for the protection of
human rights.
1. Major Cases
a. Military Tribunals
In the cases following World War II, corporate directors were prosecuted for War
Crimes. Directors of I.G. Farben and Krupp were found guilty of having violated various
laws of war for acts of the corporation during wartime. The United State Military
Tribunal (USMT) held five Farben directors “criminally liable for the use of slave
labor.”23 However, since the USMT only had jurisdiction over individuals, it could not

22

NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 56A:01 (6th ed. 2000). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
23

Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination of Forced
Labor Cases and Their Impact on The Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91,
106 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 51].
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prosecute the corporation itself, only the directors.24 The USMT charged leaders of the
Krupp firm with crimes against humanity for the firm’s actions during the war. These
cases found six Krupp employees guilty of spoliation and plunder. In both cases, the
court refers to the corporation as a whole, although it was only able to hold individuals
responsible for the crimes.25
In the post-WWII trials, Japanese Mining officials were prosecuted by the British
War Crimes Court. Eight managers of the mines were found guilty of mistreating
prisoners, even though at least one had never directly participated in the abuse.26
Individual mangers, then, have been found guilty of human rights abuses even when they
may not have even directly ordered the abuses.
b. International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the Court of the UN.27 Under its Statute,
the ICJ has jurisdiction over State parties only.28 Neither legal nor natural persons may
24

Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50-55 (1946).
(“Each occupying authority, within its Zone of Occupation, (a) shall have the right to cause persons within
such Zone suspected of having committed a crime, including those charged with crime by one of the United
Nations, to be arrested and shall take under control the property, real and personal, owned or controlled by
the said persons, pending decisions as to its eventual disposition. (b) shall report to the Legal Directorate
the name of all suspected criminals, the reasons for and the places of their detention, if they are detained,
and the names and location of witnesses…(d) shall have the right to cause all persons so arrested and
charged, and not delivered to another authority as herein provided, or released, to be brought to trial before
an appropriate tribunal. Such tribunal may, in the case of crimes committed by persons of German
citizenship or nation.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
25

Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination of Forced
Labor Cases and Their Impact on The Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91
(2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 51].
26

Id. at 117. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 51].

27

Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 1 (“The International Court of Justice established by the
Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations shall be constituted and
shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 17].
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be a party to cases in the ICJ. Liability may impute to the State for failure to ensure
human rights, under various treaties.29 If the state is responsible for prosecuting
violations, even those committed by corporations, a case may be brought in the ICJ for
failure to ensure human rights as enumerated in the treaties.30 As both parties to the case
must be States, the ICJ may be a difficult forum in which to prosecute these cases.
c. International Tribunals
In addition to the prosecutions following WWII, more recent international
tribunal cases have addressed similar issues. In the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, the court held that the corporate directors of media outlets that encouraged the
genocide had committed war crimes.31 Those convicted were found to have proximate
cause relating to the genocide, and were found individually criminally responsible.
d. Domestic Civil Cases
The US Courts have recently been very involved in litigation regarding human
rights abuses through the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).32 The ATCA gives non-U.S.
citizens a forum for civil remedies via the United States federal court system. The tort in

28

Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 34(1). (“Only states may be parties in cases before the
Court.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].

29

Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations
in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449 (1990). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52].

30

Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36. (“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
treaties and conventions in force.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].

31

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No.: ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (Dec.
3, 2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29].

32

Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59].

9

question must have been a violation of a violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
U.S.33 For example, the court held that the ATCA gave the federal courts jurisdiction
over an alleged torture case, where the alleged tort was committed by a non-U.S. citizen
for acts occurring outside the U.S.34 Torture is a violation of the law of nations; the court
here cited not only UN treaties denouncing the use of torture and a European Court of
Human Rights Cases, but “its universal renunciation in the modern usage and practice of
nations”.35
Corporations have been brought to U.S. courts under the ATCA. There have been
numerous cases filed in the United Status under the ACTA for crimes committed during
WWII, both by the Germans and the Japanese.36 One notable case, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. was against two large foreign holding companies.37 The plaintiffs, former
Nigerians, sued these holding companies for actions the companies had allegedly taken
against the plaintiffs due to their opposition to the corporations’ actions in Nigeria. The
Circuit Court ruled that the case could be properly heard in the United States; Royal
Dutch Petroleum’s appeal to the United States Supreme Court was denied, allowing the
case to continue in U.S. federal courts.38

33

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59].

34

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (C.A. N.Y.) (1980). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 24].
35

Id. at 883-885 (C.A. N.Y.) (1980). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24].

36

Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination of Forced
Labor Cases and Their Impact on The Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91,
119-130 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 51].
37

Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 34].

38

Royal Dutch Petroleum v. Wiwa, 532 U.S. 941 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 31].
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Doe v. Unocal, another case brought in the U.S. courts under the ATCA, was
settled for an undisclosed sum.39 The plaintiffs alleged that Unocal committed human
rights abuses during its construction of an oil pipeline in Burma (Myanmar). The
Burmese were subject to many of these human rights abuses at the hands of the Burmese
Army, which was guarding the pipeline.40
Another case, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., was dismissed in 2001.41 The case
charged Texaco with pollution and other environmental damages during Texaco’s
extraction of oil in Ecuador. 42 It, too, was brought under the ACTA.
Other suits have ended in transfer or settlement, resulting in millions of dollars in
known donations. Nike, for example, donated $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association
after it was charged with sweatshop abuses. 43 The case ended up being heard by the
Supreme Court for free speech issues.44 In 1999 a class action lawsuit was filed against
32 corporations operating in Saipan regarding labor conditions. The corporations
donated $1.25 million to implement a labor monitoring program.45 Dow Union Carbide

39

For more on the ATCA and Doe v. Unocal, see Sonia Jiminez, The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Tool for
Repairing Ethically Challenged U.S. Corporations, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 721 (2004). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 45].
40

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45].

41

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 142 F.Supp.2d 534 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
23].

42

Niki Woodward, Fighting Goliath, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN, Dec. 31, 2003. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 78].

43

Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, Nike Gets a Pass, ZNET, Sep. 23, 2003. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 74].

44

Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

45

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Corporations and Human Rights, World Report (2000). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
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was charged in US courts for crimes related to an explosion at the Bhopal, India, plant.
The case was later transferred to Indian court. 46
In South Africa, following the fall of apartheid, a Truth and Reconciliation
Committee was established. Archbishop Desmond Tutu chaired the Committee, which
explored human rights abuses during and because of apartheid. Not only were
individuals brought before the Commission, but corporations were as well.47 The African
National Congress submitted a report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
regarding the role of business in apartheid.48 The report charged businesses with playing
a role in crafting apartheid laws as well as enforcing its own discriminatory practices.
During the hearings a representative from the business community admitted that the
community should have played a larger role in fighting apartheid.49
In the UK, the House of Lords has allowed an asbestos claim against a British
corporation operating in South Africa.50 The case does not concern a violation of human
rights, per se, but the groundbreaking decision was based, in part, on the European

46

THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE IN BHOPAL, Press Release, December 3, 2003: Take Action
Against Corporate Crime, (Dec. 3, 2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70].

47

Rebecca M. Bratspies, “Organs of Society”: A Plea for Human Rights Accountability for Transnational
Enterprises and Other Business Enterprises, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 9 (2005). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
48

African AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, Submission to Special Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Hearing on The Role of Business (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
49

Jeremy Vine, South Africa Truth Commission examines role of business, BBC NEWS, Nov. 11, 1997.
(“Raymond Parsons, of the South African Chamber of Business, came out with what some may well regard
as the understatement of the day: with the benefit of hindsight, he said, it may well be that the enormity of
the apartheid system required strong responses from business on certain key issues.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 77].
50

Asbestos Miners Allowed UK Trial, BBC NEWS, Jul. 20 2000. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 61].
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Convention of Human Rights.51 The British courts would not generally have jurisdiction
over the victims’ claims, however, the House of Lords found that justice would be denied
if the case was heard in South Africa.52
2. Treaties and the Role of International Organizations
a. United Nations and Treaties
The majority of the United Nations work on corporate violations of human rights
focuses on the duty of the State to enforce or punish such violations. A number of
treaties and organizations within the UN have provisions relevant to corporate violations
of human rights. The evolution of these treaties, and human rights enforcement in
general, bound States, although there is a rising recognition that individual actors, and not
just States, may violate human rights.53
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)54 is not a binding treaty, but
one widely recognized as setting the standard for human rights.55 The UDHR protects

51

Schalk Willem Burger Lubbe v. Cape, PLC, British House of Lords, July 20, 2000. (“Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights: The plaintiffs submitted that to stay these proceedings in favour
of the South African forum would violate the plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the European
Convention since it would, because of the lack of funding and legal representation in South Africa, deny
them a fair trial on terms of litigious equality with the defendant. For reasons already given, I have
concluded that a stay would lead to a denial of justice to the plaintiffs. Since, as Spiliada makes clear, a
stay will not be granted where it is established by cogent evidence that the plaintiff will not obtain justice in
the foreign forum, I cannot conceive that the court would grant a stay in any case where adequate funding
and legal representation of the plaintiff were judged to be necessary to the doing of justice and these were
clearly shown to be unavailable in the foreign forum although available here. I do not think Article 6
supports any conclusion which is not already reached on application of Spiliada principles. I cannot,
however, accept the view of the second Court of Appeal that it would be right to decline jurisdiction in
favour of South Africa even if legal representation were not available there.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
52

Id.[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
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the rights of all people, and requires that not only people, but all “organs of society”
respect the rights of the declaration.56 Corporations are organs of society, and then must
promote and respect human rights.57 Further, the UDHR proclaims that no “State, group
or person” has “any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms” in the Declaration.58 Various articles of
the UDHR outline rights which may be especially relevant in light of the concern over
corporate violations. Rights to life, liberty and security59 are followed up by prohibitions
against slavery60 and torture.61 Two specific articles relate to work and leisure. The right
to work, and decent working conditions and pay are outlined in Article 23,62 while Article

55

UDHR Preamble, (“Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations…”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

56

Id. (“Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
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Rebecca M. Bratspies, “Organs of Society”: A Plea for Human Rights Accountability for Transnational
Enterprises and Other Business Enterprises, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 9 (2005). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
58

UDHR, Art. 30. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
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UDHR, Art. 3 (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
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UDHR, Art. 4 (“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be
prohibited in all their forms.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

61

UDHR, Art. 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

62

UDHR, Art. 23 (“Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the
right to equal pay for equal work. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary,
by other means of social protection. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
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24 protects the right to leisure and holidays.63 These provisions of the UDHR are ones
that may specifically relate to corporate acts.
In some cases, it may be alleged that corporations committed, or participated in,
genocide. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide64
requires state parties to prevent and punish genocide. However, the convention permits
only punishment of individuals.65 This document, then, puts the onus of prosecution on
the State, and allows for prosecution of individuals, not corporations.
Another UN document which puts the primary obligation on the State to ensure
human rights is the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (The Norms).66 Within the
document, there is an explicit recognition that businesses are obligated to follow
recognized norms set out in numerous UN documents puts secondary obligations on
corporations.67 Corporations are prohibited from engaging in discrimination, genocide,

63

UDHR Art. 24 (“Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

64

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide , GA Res. 260 A (III), Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S 277. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

65

Id., Art. 4 (“Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

66

Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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Id. (“Realizing that transnational corporations and other business enterprises, their officers and persons
working for them are also obligated to respect generally recognized responsibilities and norms contained in
United Nations treaties and other international instruments such as the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Slavery Convention and the Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Rights of
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war crimes, crimes against humanity torture, and other such crimes.68 The obligation is
not only to refrain from such behavior, but corporations are required to use “due
diligence in ensuring that their activities do not contribute” to human rights abuses, and
that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from such human rights abuses.69

the Child; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families; the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and two Additional Protocols
thereto for the protection of victims of war; the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; the Convention on Biological Diversity; the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage; the Convention on Civil Liability for
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment; the Declaration on the Right to
Development; the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development; the Plan of Implementation of
the World Summit on Sustainable Development; the United Nations Millennium Declaration; the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights; the International Code of Marketing of Breast milk
Substitutes adopted by the World Health Assembly; the Ethical Criteria for Medical Drug Promotion and
the “Health for All in the Twenty-First Century” policy of the World Health Organization; the Convention
against Discrimination in Education of the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization;
conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Organization; the Convention and Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the American
Convention on Human Rights; the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development; and other instruments.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 11].
68

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

69

Commentary on the Draft Norms of the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, Commentary Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2002/8,
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 54th Sess., Provisional Agenda, Item
4, at 4, P1(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38 (May 30, 2003). (“Transnational corporations and other
business enterprises shall have the responsibility to use due diligence in ensuring that their activities do not
contribute directly or indirectly to human abuses, and that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from
buses of which they were aware or ought to have been aware. Transnational corporations and other
business enterprises shall further refrain from activities that would undermine the rule of law as well as
governmental and other efforts to promote and ensure respect for human rights, and shall use their
influence in order to help promote and ensure respect for human rights. Transnational corporations and
other business enterprises shall inform themselves of the human rights impact of their principal activities
and major proposed activities so that they can further avoid complicity in human rights abuses. The Norms
may not be used by States as an excuse for failing to take action to protect human rights, for example,
through the enforcement of existing laws.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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Further, corporations are reminded that they have the obligation to follow the rule
of law, both internationally and domestically.70 As binding, The Norms take a step
forward in recognizing corporate responsibility towards human rights. The Norms set
forth implementation methods, declaring that corporations are required to take specific
steps in compliance with The Norms, and they are further subject to UN monitoring and
verification.71
The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,72 recognizes “not
only that legal persons such as corporations can commit international crimes, but also
provide regimes for national enforcement.”73 This convention, like many other
instruments, puts the onus on the State to enforce the treaty.
b. International Labour Organization (ILO)
In 1919, the International Labour Organization (ILO) was founded, in part, to
protect workers, and maintain stable political structures.74 Members of the ILO are

70

Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). (“10. Transnational corporations
and other business enterprises shall recognize and respect applicable norms of international law, national
laws and regulations, as well as administrative practices, the rule of law, the public interest, development
objectives, social, economic and cultural policies including transparency, accountability and prohibition of
corruption, and authority of the countries in which the enterprises operate.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

71

Id. H: General Provisions of Implementation. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
See: Surya Deva, UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction? 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493 (2004).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 43].

72

United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex I, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001), not in force. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

73

Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025 (2001).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39].

74

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION , ILO HISTORY. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 9].
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States75 that have agreed to voluntarily adopt labor standards and labor rights.76 The ILO
creates conventions, which are then ratified by member states.77 Ratified conventions are
considered binding upon the States which have adopted them.78 Adjudication for failing
to submit to observe an ILO Conference is through the ICJ.79 The ICJ, discussed supra,
only has jurisdiction over State parties, not corporations.80
c. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
The OECD is made up of 30 countries, the majority of them Western.81 The aim
of the OECD is to address issues of globalization with a commitment to a market
economy.82 The OECD has legal personality.83
The OECD can promulgate legally binding treaties, either Decisions or
International Agreements. State parties must abstain from entering into the Decision for

75

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, ILO CONSTITUTION, Arts. 2, 29, 31, 32, 34, 1919. [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

76

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, ABOUT THE ILO, MANDATE, [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
77

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, ILO CONSTITUTION, Art. 19, 1919. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

78

Id. Art. 20. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

79

Id. Art. 29. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 34(1) (“Only states may be parties in cases before the
Court.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RATFICATION OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE OECD: OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

82

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Overview of the OECD: What is it?
History? Who does what? Structure of the organization. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
15].
83

Supplementary Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for European Economic Co-operation on the Legal
Capacity, Privileges and Immunities of the Organisation, Art. 1, Apr.16, 1948. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
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it to not be legally binding upon that country. The OECD may also promulgate
International Agreements, as binding as any others. The OECD has other types of legal
acts that are not binding, but generally indicate a trend in the will of the majority.84
The OECD has published the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which are
ratified by member States, not individual corporations.85 The enterprises are nonetheless
responsible for adhering to the guidelines, once adopted by the State. Human rights are
specifically enumerated as a responsibility of the enterprise, as they relate to the host
country’s obligations under its own laws and treaties.86 The OECD Guidelines require
host countries to ensure that businesses comply with the Guidelines, otherwise, the
governments themselves may be held responsible fore the violations.87
The war in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo implicated the OECD
Guidelines. In fact, the United Nations Panel of Expert used the Guidelines as a standard
for business behavior.88 The Panel alleged, in an October 2002 report, that “eighty-five
companies involved in business activities in the DRC breached international norms,

84

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE OECD.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

85

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: TEXT, COMMENTARY AND CLARIFICATIONS, Oct. 31, 1999. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
86

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: TEXT, COMMENTARY AND CLARIFICATIONS, Oct. 31, 1999.
(“II. General Policies: Enterprises should fully take into account established policies in the countries in
which they operate, and consider the views of other stakeholders. In this regard, enterprises should: … 2.
Respect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s
international obligations and commitments.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
87

Stephen Kabel, Our Business is People (Even if it Kills Them): The Contribution of Multinational
Enterprises to the Conflict in the Republic of Congo, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461 (2004).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
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including the OECD Guidelines.”89 While the UN met with many corporations that
allegedly violated human rights through business practices during this time period, there
was no State action on the part of the member States. Human Rights Watch criticized the
unpunished violation of the OECD Guidelines with respect to corporations operating in
the Democratic Republic of Congo.90
The OECD warns companies that while local laws may allow the use of force in order
to protect property, the enterprises must control security so that the enterprises
themselves “do not become party to human rights violations.”91 The OECD recommends
that corporations keep in mind the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,
the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers, and the UN Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.92 The OECD also reminds
readers that resettlement may invoke human rights laws, and references the World Bank’s
guidelines.93
While the OECD may have some binding principles or treaties, they are rarely
enforced. The OECD has investigated only 30 cases of violations under its corporate
guidelines since 1976.94
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Id. at 466 (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH D.R. Congo: U.N. Must Address Corporate Role in War, Human Rights Watch,
Oct. 27, 2003, [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 65].
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ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES IN SITUATIONS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT AND WIDESPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, paragraph
18, May 2002. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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Id. p. 23, paras 56 & 57, May 2002. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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Id. page 23. para 58. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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James A. Paul and Jason Garred, Making Corporations Accountable: A Background Paper for the United
Nations Financing for Development Process, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (2000). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 75].
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d. Global Compact
Another voluntary initiative by the UN is the Global Compact, which seeks to
integrate business practices with ten UN business principles in order to produce a “more
sustainable and inclusive global economy”.95 Two of the ten principles relate to human
rights.96 Businesses are encouraged to support and respect human rights, and make sure
that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.97 The participants include 12
International Inter-Sectoral Organizations, seven International Sector Business
Organizations, 91 Local Business Associations, 2250 Businesses, including three
subsidiaries; includes 98 of the Global 500, six cities (Bath, UK; Jinan, PR China;
Melbourne, Australia; Nurnberg, Germany; Porto Alegre, Brazil; Plock, Poland) and four
stock exchanges (Bovespa [Sao Paulo, Brazil], Jakarta Stock Exchange, Istanbul Stock
Exchange, Euronext).
3. Customary International Law
a.

Establishment

While there is a trend towards prosecuting MNCs for violating human rights,
these types of violations are not part of customary international law (CIL). While many
human rights documents clearly establish norms and practices through written
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instruments, CIL is unwritten, though binding. 98 CIL derives from the practice of States,
not from any specific treaty.99 The ICJ, for example, applies customary international,
defined as “a general practice accepted as law.”100
CIL can be expressed in treaties, but it need not be. Treaties may reflect CIL, but
a treaty may not reflect CIL that would be binding upon all States. If the treaty is
recognized by a large majority of States, an argument could be made that the treaty, then,
would either establish or recognize CIL.101
The majority of CIL, as document by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, concerns armed conflicts, military operations, and State action. The enumerated
laws in the ICRC study put responsibility on the State or individuals for violations of the
laws.102
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Not only is Customary International Law concerned, for the most part, with State
actors, it requires a general sense of obligation to act in compliance with CIL.103 This
obligation must arise from a belief that compliance is required by law.
b. Trend Towards Corporate Awareness of Human Rights Violations
As discussed earlier in this paper, since World War II, there have been numerous
prosecutions of leaders of corporations, and an overall increase in the awareness of
human rights. This has mainly played out with respect to individual criminal liability for
human rights abuses, but it has been recognized voluntarily by corporations. For
example, the World Bank delayed approval of a pipeline project in Chad in 1999 due, in
part, to human rights concerns.104 In another example, a Swiss gold corporation stopped
buying gold from Uganda following a Human Rights Watch report examining the human
rights abuses committed by those selling the gold.105 These corporate-directed activities
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based on human rights show a clear trend for the adoption of human rights concerns by
corporations.
Additionally, groups or corporation may invoke voluntary process to protect human
rights. Voluntary processes established by individuals, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and businesses have helped raise awareness of human rights violations, and
imposed voluntary obligations. For example, in 1977, the Sullivan Principles proposed a
set of rules to address investments in apartheid South Africa. 106 These principles were
“designed to help persuade US companies with investments in South Africa to treat their
African employees the same as they would their American counterparts.”107 These
principles were re-launched in 1999 as the Global Sullivan Principles of Social
Responsibility.108 Over 25 manufacturers, 80 service businesses and 60 professional
service firms endorsed the principles.109 While there is no judicial recourse for violations
of the principles, the organizations involved have pledged not only to uphold the
principles, but to report relevant information. Transparency is key in the implementation
of the Sullivan Principles.
Another voluntary process organized to address a human rights issue is the Kimberley
Process. This is a process by which States document that the diamonds passing through
its borders are not “conflict diamonds.” The Kimberley Process was established by
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diamond producers to stem the flow of conflict diamonds – diamonds that helped fund
rebel movements in Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.110
The UN General Assembly approved resolution in December 2000.111 Forty-five
countries, including Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have
agreed to this process. The Kimberley Process requires participants to set up a system of
certification for to “eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough
diamonds” both in and out of the country.112 This process appears to be enforced, as the
Democratic Republic of Congo was removed from the participant list in July, 2004.113
C. Enforcement
Customary International Law would not, as yet, include any specific mechanism
for prosecuting human rights violations perpetrated by corporations. The argument has
been made that violations of CIL may be punished in any domestic court, as such crimes
conferred universal jurisdiction.114 States have an obligation to ensure human rights
under some treaties, which have only codified CIL; in such cases there are domestic
enforcement mechanisms. International mechanism for enforcement are more
complicated.
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However, CIL may be enforced in other ways, such as using the ACTA in U.S.
courts. The exceptions to the State Action requirement, as discussed above, are genocide,
war crimes, piracy, and crimes against humanity. If a corporation violated any of these
four Customary International Laws, a suit could be brought in courts that allowed
prosecution for violating the law of nations.
C. ALTERNATIVES AND SOLUTIONS
1. Amend Rome Statute
The most obvious solution to the current statutory limitations under the Rome
Statute is to amend the Rome Statute. Under its own terms, the Rome Statute can be
amended seven years after its entry into force, 115 which was July 1, 2002. 116 Proposals
must be voted upon, and approved by two-thirds of member States.117 While the process
may be time-consuming or contentious, the ICC cannot continue to lack jurisdiction over
corporate crimes. Numerous crimes may go unpunished - economic crimes, including
money laundering, will escape international prosecution.118
2. Issues with Prosecuting Corporations
Corporate criminal liability itself is not without issue. The concept is one of
general vicarious liability: by holding the corporation as a whole responsible for actions,
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it is the shareholders and the name of the corporation that are punished, not the individual
actors who made the criminal decisions.119
Individuals may be fined or jailed under the Rome Statute.120 Corporations,
however, may only be fined. While fining the corporation does make the corporation, as
an entity, theoretically more responsive to its shareholders, the threat of prison terms for
individuals may well be a sufficient deterrent to individual actors.121 However,
individuals will still be required to give testimony and turn over evidence, and a
corporation, while a legal person, cannot take actions.
3.

Prosecuting Individuals is an Option under the Current Rome
Statute

Nothing in the Rome Statute precludes prosecution of individual corporate actors
for violating crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute. Just as individuals were prosecuted
in the post-WWII cases, individuals may be prosecuted for their roles in current human
rights abuses.122 The ICC maintains jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.123
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Under a theory of command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise, business
leaders may be held responsible for corporate violations of human rights under the Rome
Statute. Even if the business leader did not commit the crime himself, these doctrines
will allow individual prosecutions as permitted by the Rome Statute.
Under command responsibility, a leader may be culpable for the acts of his
subordinates, even if he did not directly order those acts.124 The doctrine of command
responsibility was applied in a WWII case against a Japanese military commander.
General Yamashita’s troops had brutalized both American Prisoners of War and native
Filipinos while in the Philippines.125 There was no evidence that the General had been
personally involved in the actions, however, he was found guilty of the crimes committed
by his troops due to his failure to prevent those actions.126
More recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia applied the
doctrine of individual criminal responsibility in Delalic,127 charging a supervisor with
command responsibility for the illegal acts of his subordinates. 128 The ICTY, citing
Yamashita, declared that command responsibility is part of CIL, and may be direct and
positive, or arise from an omission on the part of the commander.129
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Commanders need not be military commanders to have command responsibility.
Civilian commanders were prosecuted in the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Tribunal
along with military commanders.130
Both the ICTY and ICTR have applied the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise,
the ICTY notably in the Tadic case,131 and the ICTR in the Kayishema case.132 The ICTY
case defendant, Dusko Tadic, was a member of a group of men who invaded a town, beat
five men, and allegedly killed them. The Court found that while there was no direct
evidence that Tadic killed the men, he was responsible nonetheless because the risk of
death was a foreseeable outcome of the joint enterprise and if the actors were reckless
with respect to that risk.133 The ICTR case concerned command responsibility with
respect to a civilian commander. The court found that although there was no military
authority exercised, the civilian defendant possessed the requisite amount of authority to
be held responsible for the actions of his subordinates.134 The Rome Statute addresses
command responsibility in Article 28, distinguishing between military and non-military
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leaders.135 While the Rome Statute does not impose upon non-military leaders the same
level of duty imposed upon military leaders, it is clear that non-military leaders are
nonetheless responsible for the actions of their underlings.
These cases, it is important to note, will be inadmissible if the State is already
undertaking an investigation.136 In order to respect State sovereignty the “ICC can hear a
case only when national authorities where the alleged offense occurred are unable or
willing to investigate, or when they investigate but refuse to prosecute substantiated
allegations due to a simple lack of interest.”137 The ICC may only hear a case, currently,
when individuals are being prosecuted, and the State has failed to investigate or prosecute
that individual. As long as the case is admissible, the application of these doctrines
creates a path for prosecution of corporate leaders for corporate crimes that fall under the
ICC’s jurisdiction.
4. Other Prosecutions
There are alternative prosecutions, as mentioned earlier in this paper. For
example, domestic courts, like the United States, may be one way in which corporations
as a whole may be held liable for human rights violations. The United States courts
could hear cases under the Alien Tort Claims Act. ICC prosecution is complementary to
135
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domestic courts, however, the U.S. courts may hear claims of violations of CIL by nonU.S. parties. 138
III. CONCLUSION

The Rome Statute, which governs the functioning of the International Criminal
Court, allows for suits against individuals only. Human rights have been gaining
prominence on the international scene, as evidence through recent changes in world
politics. The examples of corporations making changes in business decisions is evidence
of this rising recognition; however, this slow changing of norms does not result in any
recognition under customary international for punishment of human rights violations by
corporations. Nonetheless, the ICC may prosecute individuals for their roles in such
crimes, even if the corporations themselves cannot be brought to justice by the ICC.
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